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Uncertainty and Financing Constraints
HONG BO, ROBERT LENSINK and ELMER STERKEN
Department of Economics, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Abstract. Using a panel of Dutch listed firms this paper provides empirical evidence for the hypo-
thesis that more risky firms are confronted with more severe capital market constraints than relatively
less risky firms. The paper also contributes to the discussion on the usefulness of cash flow as a meas-
ure of financial constraints. We present a stochastic version of the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) model.
We show that cash flow sensitivity can be used as a meaningful indicator of financing constraints if
firms are classified by the degree of uncertainty they face and if the uncertainty originates from cost
uncertainty.
Key words: financing structure, investment, uncertainty
JEL classification codes: E22, G32.
1. Introduction
In the last decade new insights with respect to investment theory center around two
themes: the role of capital market imperfections and the effect of uncertainty on
irreversible investment. The capital market imperfections literature shows that cor-
porate investment is sensitive to internal funds if financial constraints are effective.
In a world with perfect capital markets, firms will be indifferent with respect to
financing investment with internal or external funds (Modigliani and Miller 1958).
However, it is well known that financial markets are normally characterized by
imperfections related to asymmetric information problems, such as monitoring and
screening issues (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Myers and
Majluf 1984). Under asymmetric information the Modigliani-Miller proposition no
longer holds and investment depends on the financial structure.
The investment under uncertainty literature focuses on the importance of uncer-
tainty with respect to selling price, sales, stock prices, etc. on investment. Orthodox
studies on investment and uncertainty show that a competitive risk neutral firm is
positively affected by uncertainty as long as the marginal productivity of capital
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authors thank the session participants at the American Economic Association meetings, Atlanta 2002,
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is a convex function of prices, which will be the case for a constant returns to
scale production function (Hartman 1972; Caballero 1991). The more recent real
option approach to investment under uncertainty (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994)
argues that it is more likely that uncertainty affects investment negatively. This
literature emphasizes the importance of the irreversibility of investment and the
option value of waiting to invest. The option value of waiting probably increases
if uncertainty of the underlying investment project increases, leading to a negative
effect of uncertainty on investment. However, the option approach to investment
under uncertainty can also explain a nonlinear investment-uncertainty relationship
(Sarkar 2000). Most empirical studies find a negative linear investment-uncertainty
relationship though (see Lensink, Bo and Sterken 2001).
Both lines of research resulted in important new insights with respect to the
modeling of investment. There are some theoretical attempts to integrate the two
lines of theory, see e.g., Lensink and Sterken (2002). However, quite surprisingly,
there is no empirical literature available that tries to combine them, although it is
apparent that uncertainty and capital market imperfections are interlinked. This is
obvious if debt holders are risk averse, since then higher uncertainty, leading to
more risky projects, will result in an increase of the risk premium. However, this
will also be the case with risk neutral debt holders due to limited liability. Equity
holders of a firm have an incentive to select projects with higher risks if investments
are partly financed by debt. Rational debt holders, however, will anticipate this
behavior and charge an interest premium that reflects the expected costs they must
bear in the event of default. Therefore, equity holders will ultimately bear the costs
of more uncertainty in the form of an increase in the wedge between internal and
external financing costs.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically explore the abovementioned rela-
tionship between uncertainty, capital market imperfections and investment using
a panel of Dutch firms. Note that we do not aim to disentangle all possible re-
lationships between capital market imperfections, uncertainty, and their effect on
investment. Rather, we focus on one possible way in which uncertainty and capital
market imperfections are interlinked. More specifically, we argue that a group of
relatively risky firms, i.e., firms that are faced with higher degrees of uncertainty,
will suffer more from financial constraints than a group of relatively safe firms.
Consequently, an increase in uncertainty (risk) will have an indirect negative effect
on investment via more severe capital market constraints.
Section 2 describes the general methodology of the empirical models of in-
vestment under capital market constraints. The approach basically compares the
elasticity of investment with respect to a measure of internal funds, say cash flow,
for different groups of firms. A higher elasticity suggests more severe capital mar-
ket constraints. This approach is popularized by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
(FHP) (1988), and now used by a long list of authors (for a survey, see Lensink,
Bo and Sterken 2001). Although numerous researchers have followed the method-
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of investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints. To assess
our results carefully it is important to have a closer look at this critique. Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) (KZ) criticize the FHP approach by pointing out that it is only
meaningful to look at differences in the elasticity of investment with respect to
cash flow if the investment-cash flow sensitivity is monotonically increasing with
respect to the indicator used to classify firms. In Section 3 we present a stochastic
version of the model proposed by KZ and examine to what extent the KZ-critique
also holds for our model. Assuming that a manager behaves in line with a constant
absolute risk aversion utility function we show that our approach does not suffer
from the KZ-critique. Consequently, this paper also contributes to the discussion on
the usefulness of using cash flow sensitivities as measures of financial constraints.
Section 4 describes our data set. It contains 96 Dutch listed firms covering the
period 1985–1997. The section also presents a graphical description of the data,
which shows that firms facing higher uncertainty (no matter what the source of
the uncertainty might be) experience larger investment-cash flow sensitivities. This
provides a first indication that firms faced with higher degrees of uncertainty are
more capital market constrained. Sections 5 and 6 are the main parts of the paper,
presenting two sets of estimation results with respect to the effect of uncertainty on
investment are presented. In Section 5 we use an endogenous threshold approach.
The argument to use this approach runs as follows. The FHP approach requires
that firms can be divided into sub-samples based on criteria that identify ex ante
the firms that face the most severe financial constraints. In our case, we classify
firms on the basis of the degree of uncertainty. One of the main problems with this
approach is that the threshold variable used to split the entire group of firms is exo-
genous. In Section 5 we try to circumvent this problem by estimating a threshold
investment model as suggested by Hansen (1999). The main advantage of the
Hansen approach is that the estimates of the thresholds are conditional on the model
specification as a whole. We find that more uncertainty leads to larger investment-
cash flow sensitivities, indicating more severe capital market constraints for the
group of firms with risky projects. There is, however, a drawback to using the
Hansen-procedure, as it is in fact a simple Least Squares strategy, not allowing for
endogeneity of the regressors. Since the assumption of fully endogenous regressors
seems too restrictive, Section 6 analyzes the results further using the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. We base our classification of firms on the
results obtained in Section 5. The GMM results also confirm our hypothesis that
firms faced with higher degrees of uncertainty will suffer more from capital market
imperfections. Finally, Section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. The FHP Methodology
The methodology we use follows the recent empirical literature that examines the
effects of capital market imperfections on investment. This literature, based on the
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constraints, examines to what extent a proxy of internal funds (cash flow) affects
investment. As Chirinko (1993) argues, one might use a reduced-form q-model of
investment (see FHP 1988) or estimate Euler-conditions to analyze the impact of
financial variables on investment decisions (see e.g., Whited 1992). In the reduced
form investment model a measure for internal funds is directly included as one of
the regressors. In the Euler approach, measures of internal funds indirectly affect
investment via a Lagrange multiplier. The Euler approach has the advantage that
future profitability, like marginal q, does not need to be specified. On the other
hand the Euler model incorporates dynamics, which can complicate estimation (see
Whited 1992, for a detailed discussion).
We base our empirical analysis on the reduced-form cash flow model and pro-
ceed with an exposition of this model. The major theoretical notion of the standard
investment-cash flow model is the upward sloping supply curve of financial capital
with internal resources as the cheapest funds (see Duesenberry 1958). The higher
the cost difference between internal and external funds, the more a firm will have to
rely on its own funds. Since investment-cash flow sensitivity is generally significant
and positive for all firms, most of the literature takes the following approach. The
sample is divided according to an a priori measure of financing constraints (such
as firm size, age, dividend-payout ratio, business group affiliation etc.), whereafter
the investment-cash flow sensitivities of the different sub-samples are compared
(see, e.g., FHP, Hoshi et al. 1991, and Hu and Schiantarelli 1998). Higher cash
flow sensitivity is seen as evidence of tighter capital market constraints.
The primary innovation of our paper is the classification of firms. We argue that
firms that are faced with more uncertainty (the risky firms) will suffer more form
financing constraints. Therefore, we classify firms into a group facing high and low
uncertainty (measured via different indicators). Subsequently, we compare cash
flow sensitivities of both groups in order to test whether firms with high uncertainty
suffer more from capital market constraints.
Although numerous researchers have followed the above-mentioned method-
ology, it is not undisputed. The main critique focuses on three issues; the (time
independent) a priori classification of firms in different groups, the problem that
internal funds may also proxy for the profitability of investment and the use of
investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints. To judge our
results it is important to have a closer look at these points of critique, and to explain
how we deal with them in the empirical analyses. We deal with the first two items
in this section and leave the last point to the discussion of our theoretical innovation
in Section 3.
An a priori classification of firms is problematic since the threshold used to
classify firms in different groups is set arbitrarily. Moreover, although it might be
possible to identify constrained firms, it is quite often impossible to identify the
years during which a firm is constrained. This makes it impossible to differentiate
between firm-specific effects on investment and the effects of financing constraints
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method, the so-called threshold estimation technique developed by Hansen (1999),
in Section 5.
Some authors argue that the relationship between investment and measures
of the availability of internal funds may suffer from the fact that internal funds
may proxy for the profitability of investment. In that case, a positive relationship
between internal funds and investment may be expected since firms with more
liquidity are doing well and have better investment possibilities (Hoshi, et al. 1991).
This may imply that the cash flow coefficient cannot be interpreted in terms of
capital market imperfections. The usual way to get around this problem is to add
Tobin’s q or the market-to-book ratio as an independent variable in the model, and
that is exactly what we will do in the empirical analyses in Sections 5 and 6.
3. Are Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Useful Measures of Financing
Constraints?1
In the literature there is an ongoing discussion of the usefulness of investment-cash
flow sensitivities as measures of financing constraints. Some authors (including
ourselves) follow FHP and argue that a comparison of investment-cash flow sensit-
ivities for different groups of firms provides a good indication of the (difference in)
severity of financial constraints which these firms are faced with. This literature is
closely related to the broader “imperfections” literature, which studies adjustment
costs and (ir)reversibilities, monopolistic competition on product markets, and lack
of information on financial markets. Such imperfections might result in an increase
in the sensitivity of investment to changes in internal wealth e.g., via cash flow (see
Stein 2001).
Others oppose the use of cash flow as a measure of financing constraints. Cleary
(1999), for instance, argues that a large cash-flow sensitivity of investment may
also signal financial soundness of the firm. Knowing its financial strength and
ability to attract external funds, the firm first uses cash flow to finance investment.
The most prominent critics are Kaplan and Zingales (1997). They argue that it is
only meaningful to look at differences in the elasticity of investment with respect
to cash flow if the investment-cash flow sensitivity is monotonically increasing
with respect to the indicator used to classify firms. They provide a theoretical
example that shows that for several classification schemes strong investment-cash
flow sensitivity signals financial constraints in only very specific cases (with par-
ticular specifications of production and cost functions). FHP (2000) react to the KZ
critique by disputing their operational definition of financing constraints as well as
by pointing out some problems related to the way KZ classify firms into financially
constrained and unconstrained firms.
There is still no consensus on the issue of investment-cash flow sensitivities
today and we certainly do not try to provide a definite answer in this paper. How-
ever, we do provide a contribution to the discussion by analyzing an adjusted








roningen user on 08 M
arch 2019
302 HONG BO ET AL.
version of the model originally developed by KZ. There are various arguments
to support starting from the KZ-model. First, the model is simple and can be
easily explained. Secondly, KZ illustrate that their deterministic model shows
that strong investment-cash flow sensitivity is not necessarily a signal of finan-
cial imperfections. We will therefore examine for our classification of firms under
which conditions differences in cash flows are meaningful measures for financial
constraints. In order to be able to do this we need to develop a stochastic version
of the KZ model.
3.1. THE MANAGER’S UTILITY FUNCTION
Although a manager’s attitude towards risk is one of the salient characteristics that
show up in many analyses, there are only a few attempts to empirically measure
the risk attitude of managers. The most relevant general empirical literature on risk
attitudes is the experimental literature (see, for example, Kahneman and Tverski
1979). However, this literature is still in its infancy and often does not apply to firm
managers. Nevertheless, it is commonly assumed that managers are risk averse.
This insight comes from the recent literature on ownership and control (for an
overview, see Grinblatt and Titman 2002). This literature emphasizes that invest-
ment policies may differ if self-interested managers or outside shareholders control
investment choices. An important insight from this literature is that managers are
assumed to be risk averse. The main reason why self-interested managers are as-
sumed to be risk-averse is the fear of bankruptcy. It is even argued that managers
have a tendency to be more risk averse than shareholders. The reason is that outside
shareholders can avoid unsystematic risk by means of diversification. However, the
probability of a firm getting into financial trouble is affected by systematic and
unsystematic risk. Therefore, for managers systematic and unsystematic risk is of
importance because both affect the probability of the manager retaining his or her
job. For this reason, we assume that the manager acts according to a risk-averse
utility function.
If a manager demonstrates risk aversion she will act according to optimizing the
expected value of a concave utility function E[U(x)], where x denotes wealth, and
U ′(.) > 0 and U"(.) < 0. A certainty equivalent CE of the expected value of x,
which we denote by xe , is defined by CE= xe+p, where p is the risk premium. For
all z = x − xe, the following condition needs to hold: U(xe − p) =E[(U(xe + z)].
Using a second-order Taylor expansion and assuming small risks (see e.g., Gollier
2001), it is easy to see that p = −Ra(x)/2 E[x2], where p is sometimes called
risk compensation and Ra(x) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion.
If absolute risk aversion Ra(x) of an agent is decreasing in x, then he or she has
decreasing absolute risk aversion. If Ra(x) is constant (increasing) in x, the agent
has constant (increasing) absolute risk aversion.
As argued above, the literature is quite clear about the assumption that managers
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a manager’s absolute risk aversion is constant, increasing or decreasing. The reason
for this is clearly stated by Laffont (1993) in his chapter on “Measuring risk aver-
sion and risk”. He concludes that it is very difficult to obtain sufficient information
about an agent’s preferences, to know whether his or her absolute risk aversion
increases or decreases. The main argument is that this requires information about
the third derivative of the manager’s utility function. There are only a few empirical
studies available that have tried to measure whether absolute risk aversion increases
or decreases in wealth (see, for instance, Binswanger 1980 and Hartog et. al. 2000).
This literature seems to conclude that decreasing absolute risk aversion gives the
best representation of agent’s behavior However, it should be noticed that the few
exceptions available do not deal with firm managers. For management decisions
it may be argued that the size of personal wealth is not so relevant to the attitude
towards risk.
Because of the lack of empirical evidence on the exact type of risk aversion,
in theoretical papers all types of utility functions are found. Therefore, the choice
for a particular utility function is primarily driven by its ability to derive analytical
results, and not so much because of its success in correctly representing the attitude
towards risk of agents in the real world. The most frequently used utility functions
in economic models form part of the so-called set of harmonic absolute risk aver-
sion (HARA) utility functions (see Gollier 2001). The HARA class includes the
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
and quadratic utility functions.
We use a CARA utility function. Although the choice of this utility function is
arbitrary and other specifications exist (see Saha 1997), the CARA-class is widely
used (see Blanchard and Fischer 1989). For a positive risk premium the assump-
tion of constant absolute risk aversion implies utility functions of the exponential
class (see Pratt 1964). This class of utility functions has often been used to model
portfolio decisions (see Hendershott 1971, and Courakis 1988). In addition, some
papers have used a CARA utility function to estimate the risk attitude of producers,
see for instance Antle (1987). Although constant absolute risk aversion may be
a less plausible description of risk aversion than constant relative risk aversion
(or decreasing absolute risk aversion) the CARA specification is analytically more
convenient in our case. For this type of utility function the expression for the risk
premium is simple and only depends on the variance of the key 0wealth variable. It
should be noted, however, that the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion is
a very simplified approximation. The exponential utility function class has the main
advantage of simple derivations, but it has also a main disadvantage of leading to
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3.2. THE MODEL
Our manager derives utility from real profits (π ) according to the exponential utility
function U(π) = a − ce−απ , where U is utility and a, α and c are parameters.
Profits are stochastic: π ∼ N(µπ, σ 2π), where µπ is the mean and σ 2π is the variance.
The manager is assumed to maximize the expected value of utility which, given the
normality assumption, can be shown to be equal to:












where E[.] is the expectation operator. For the CARA-class of utility functions
this is equivalent to maximizing the certainty equivalent µπ − α2 σ 2π , because the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion is RA = −α (and α > 0). This is one reason
for our choice for the CARA-utility function. One can model risk neutrality by
setting α = 0. We model profits by:
 = λF(I ) − vC(I − W, k) − I (2)
Investment can be financed with internal funds W or external funds E : I ≡ W+E.
The opportunity cost of internal funds is the cost of capital R, which is assumed
to be equal to 1. The additional costs of external funds are given by a function
vC(E, k), where k is a measure of a firm’s wedge between the internal and external
cost of funds. The profit function (2) is similar to the one used by Kaplan and
Zingales (1997). The difference is that we add a stochastic term λ for revenue F
and a stochastic term v for costs C. λ represents uncertainty with regards to real
returns on investment; v represents the stochastic nature of the cost of attracting
external funds. We assume that:
A.1 :E[λ] = E[v] = 1 and σ = E[λ2] and ρ = E[v2]
Note that we use the property that the variance of λ is equal to the variance of the
simple deterministic transformation λ + 1. A. 1 implies:
µπ = F(I) − C(I − W, k) − I (3)
In line with the original Kaplan-Zingales model, we assume that the production
function is concave:
A.2 :F1 > 0, F11 < 0
Because of information or agency problems the use of external funds generates
a deadweight cost for the issuing firm. The total cost of raising external funds
increases with the amount of funds raised and the severity of the agency or
information problems. We assume that:
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If both uncertainty terms are not correlated (E[λµ] = 0) we can derive the variance
of profits:
σ 2 = E[λ2]f (I )2 + E[v2]C(I − W, k)2 = σF(I )2 + ρC(I − W, k)2 (4)
The first-order condition for optimal investment is:
[(1 − ασF(I ))F1(I )] = 1 + (1 + αρC(I − W, k))[C1(I − W, k)] (5)
Total differentiation of this condition, ignoring dk, gives:
[(1 − ασF)11 − (1 + αρC)C11 − α(σF 21 + ρC21)]dI
= −[(1 + αρC)C11 + αρC21 ]dW (6)
In the remainder of this section, we analyze the cost and return of uncertainty
separately, by setting ρ or σ , respectively, equal to zero. Specifically, we exam-
ine whether the investment-cash flow sensitivity is monotonically increasing with
respect to uncertainty, our indicator for classifying firms. Only if this is the case,
will the difference in cash-flow sensitivity be a meaningful measure for financial
constraints.
PROPOSITION: Under A. 1–A. 3 an increase in cost uncertainty leads to a higher
investment-cash flow sensitivity for a risk-averse manager. The effect of an increase
in return to investment uncertainty is ambiguous. For a risk-neutral manager, an
increase in uncertainty does not affect the investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Proof. For cost uncertainty, the effect of an increase in uncertainty is given by:
d2I
dWdρ
= −(CC11 + C
2
1)αF11
(C11 + αρCC11 − F11 + αρC21)2
> 0 (7)







(ασ (F 21 + FF11) + C11 − F11)2
(8)
It is immediately clear that for the risk-neutral manager (α = 0) both derivatives
are equal to zero.
QED
Equation (7) shows that the sensitivity of the internal wealth dependence of
investment dI/dW increases if cost uncertainty ρ increases. So risk-averse managers
offset a higher cost uncertainty by increasing the fraction of internally financed
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clear interpretation. The concave revenue function allows managers to benefit from
more revenue uncertainty on the one hand, but on the other it might again be more
attractive to offset the increase of risk and rely more on internal finance.
To conclude, our model shows that for reasonable assumptions investment-cash
flow sensitivities provide a useful measure of financing constraints if it is assumed
that the manager is risk averse, and if uncertainty mainly originates from uncer-
tainty in costs. So, in a stochastic world, and assuming that firms are classified
on the basis of different degrees of uncertainty, the cash flow measure seems to
perform better as a measure for financial constraints than argued by KZ. This
provides support for the FHP methodology. However, it should also be noted that
if the uncertainty originates from uncertainty in revenues, our analyses suggests
that cash flows are only useful measures for financing constraints if additional
assumptions with respect to the production function and the cost function are made.
This does not contradict our main hypothesis, since in reality these conditions may
be fulfilled. However, it does imply that we should be careful in our interpretation
of the results.
4. Data
We use a panel of Dutch listed firms to empirically test our hypothesis. During the
period 1985–1997 about 150 firms were listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.
From these firms we use the non-financial firms and remove some firms that have
exceptional accounting systems (like Royal Dutch Shell, which publishes its ac-
counts both in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). This sampling yields a
set of 112 firms. The coverage of the data for the starting years of the sample and
the most recent years is not complete though. Moreover, we use moving averages
for some variables in the specification of our model. Finally we need a balanced
set of data in one of our regression models, namely the threshold model presented
in Section 4. This restricts the final data set to 96 firms over 1990–1997. This set is
considered to be representative for the Dutch non-financial manufacturing sector.
The data are taken from the source REACH, which is maintained by the
Belgian company Bureau Van Dijk. Bureau van Dijk publishes a European equiv-
alent AMADEUS, which contains information on both listed and non-listed firms.
REACH is the Dutch subset of AMADEUS and includes more than ten thousand
Dutch firms. Our main rationale for considering listed firms is twofold. Firstly, the
way of presenting financial results is comparable among listed firms. Secondly, we
are interested in the impact of stock price volatility on firm investment and so need
stock market prices.
From the balance sheet and profit and loss account we construct the variables
listed in Table I. Sales (SALVOL) and employee volatility (EMPVOL) are based
on the observations from t−6 up to and including t (7 years in total). We calculated
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Table I. Definitions of variables.
CF cash flow (equals net profits plus depreciation);
EMP number of people employed;
EMPVOL volatility of employees (see measurement SALVOL)
EQ equity;
EQVOL= 100∗(HIGH/LOW−1) stock price volatility;
HIGH highest stock price during the year;
I capital expenditure in material fixed assets;
K material fixed assets;
LIQ liquid assets;
LOW lowest stock price during the year;
MB = MV/EQ market-to-book ratio;
MV market value of equity at the end of the year (= stock price
∗ number of shares outstanding);
SAL sales;
SALVOL volatility of sales, measured by a 7-year window coefficient
of variation of sales;
TA total assets;
WC working capital: short-term assets minus short-term liabilities.
Table II. Descriptive statistics.
Mean St.dev. Median
I/K(−1) 24.40 16.97 19.10
CF/K(−1) 42.18 16.38 33.55
EQ/K(−1) 138.44 34.91 110.75
WC/K(−1) 75.21 30.54 45.06
d(WC)/K(−1) 3.51 27.29 2.04
LIQ/K(−1) 42.39 19.72 12.13
SAL(−1)/K(−1) 665.98 148.85 427.61
MB 2.45 1.46 1.53
EQVOL 60.20 33.85 43.92
SALVOL 21.56 8.09 19.21
EMPVOL 18.80 8.33 15.60
See Table I for an explanation of the symbols used.
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Table III. Correlation matrix of the volatility vari-
ables.
EQVOL SALVOL EMPVOL
EQVOL 1 0.164 0.111
SALVOL 0.164 1 0.639
EMPVOL 0.111 0.639 1
Note that these figures present stacked correlation
coefficients (96 firms times 8 years = 768 observa-
tions). All correlation coefficients are significant
at the 99 percent confidence level (so p-values
of the hypothesis of a zero correlation are almost
equal to zero).
Table II presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the models to
be discussed below. The figures represent averages (medians) of firm’ averages
(medians) over the years. We first average over the years per firm and again take
averages of the average firm observations (and medians of medians). Table II shows
that the data are not seriously skewed, since the mean and median values coincide.
The first panel presents the major investment data. The average ratio of capital
expenditure to the stock of material fixed assets is a little over 20 per cent. Cash
flow as a percentage of material fixed assets is around 40 per cent. On average
the amount of working capital is relatively large. During the 1990–1997 period
most firms had a high market-to-book ratio. Most listed firms tried to restore their
solvency during the period 1985–1997 and succeeded in doing so. Stock price
volatility is rather large. Here we emphasize that our measure of volatility (high
minus low) can be rather sensitive to shocks in equity prices. Inspection of our
data however reveals that the high-low volatility is supported by observations in
our whole sample period. For the other measures of volatility the coefficients of
variation have rather modest means (median values) of about 20 per cent.
For our purpose we need to describe the uncertainty measures more precisely.
Table III gives the correlation matrix, which shows that the stock price volatility
is less (but still significantly) correlated with the other measures. The correlation
between sales and employee volatility is higher. So we expect the differences in
results for stock price volatility on the one hand and sales and employee uncertainty
on the other.
A natural and convenient way to describe the data is through the use of scatter-
plots of investment, cash flow and uncertainty, which may reveal non-linearity. A
simple correlation plot of the investment and cash flow ratios does not reveal the
information we want to illustrate, since investment depends on other firm specific
variables. We need to control for these firm specific effects, so we proceed as fol-
lows. First we estimate our base reference model (see also Section 4). We regress
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Figure 1. Investment-cash flow plots for low and high stock price volatility.
lagged sales (SAL(−1)/K(−1)), the lagged investment ratio (I (−1)/K(−2)) and
an intercept. We use the residuals from this estimated equation as the “conditioned”
investment data. Next we scatter these residuals with cash flow (CF/K(−1)) for
low and high volatility separately. This gives us an impression of the properties of
the data.
Figure 1 shows the results for stock price volatility. The left panel shows the
observations with stock price volatility below the median value and the right-hand
panel plots the observations with stock price volatility above the median value.
On the vertical axis we plot the residuals of the simple OLS equation and on the
horizontal axis the variable CF/K(−1). We expect the slope of the high uncertainty
plot to be steeper. The line in the Figures represents a local linear Kernel fit.2 We
did not trim the observations for outliers and the scale is different on both axes.
Figures 2 and 3 provide similar plots for low and high sales and employment volat-
ility. All the plots give a similar impression: the investment-cash flow sensitivity is
higher for higher volatilities: the slopes of the right-hand side curves are steeper on
average. Stock price volatility plots are the least convincing in this respect due to
the peculiar shape of the low-volatility line.
The descriptive statistics point at differences with respect to the investment-
cash-flow sensitivities between regimes of low and high volatility. This provides
a first indication of the relevance of our claim that firms faced with high uncer-
tainty are more troubled by capital market constraints. In the remaining sections
we examine this observation in more detail.
2 This view displays fits of local polynomial kernel regressions of the first series Y on the second
series X in the group. The kernel fits are nonparametric regressions that fit local polynomials.
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Figure 2. Investment-cash flow plots for low and high sales volatility.
Figure 3. Investment-cash flow plots for low and high employment volatility.
5. Threshold Estimation
We argue that investment, cash flow and uncertainty are interrelated. Our hypo-
thesis is that uncertainty affects investment by means of capital market imperfec-
tions. Firms that are faced with more uncertainty, say the more risky firms, will
have greater difficulties in communicating their information to their lenders, so that
fluctuations in investment spending of these risky firms, in comparison to relatively
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In this section we explore this relation empirically by considering the
investment-cash flow sensitivity for two groups of firms, classified by means of
a threshold level for uncertainty. The main argument put forward in this section
relates to the endogeneity of the cut-off level of uncertainty. In the previous section
we took the median values of the volatility variables to be the “exogenous” cut-
off levels. Here we integrate the cut-off level into the model and determine the
cut-off level of uncertainty simultaneously with the parameters of the model. We
do so using an estimation method proposed by Hansen (1999). Hansen provides
an estimation method to allow for different regression functions across subclasses
of observations. Hansen applies his estimation technique to the FHP investment-
cash flow model. He finds that low-debt firms have lower investment-cash flow
sensitivity than highly indebted firms. We want to model similar investment-cash
flow sensitivities for different levels of uncertainty measures. We propose to estim-
ate such a threshold regression model for i = 1, . . . , n firms and t = 1, . . . , T





= α′zi,t−j + β ′1CFit I (Vit ≤ θ) + β ′2CFit I (Vit > θ) + 
it
j = 0, 1 (9)
where I represents net capital expenditure, K the beginning-of-period capital
stock, z is the vector of so-called regime-independent (or control) variables (which
might include fixed effects); CF is the so-called regime dependent variable (cash
flow as a percentage of the beginning-of-period capital stock); α, β1, and β2 are
(vectors of) parameters; and the error term 
it is i.i.d. with mean zero and fi-
nite variance.3 The threshold variable V is the uncertainty measure, and θ is the
threshold value of the uncertainty measure to be estimated, which does not depend
on the firm or year. I (.) represents the indicator function, which has the value one
if the argument is true and zero otherwise. So the threshold variable defines two
regimes: a low uncertainty regime with Vit ≤ θ and a high uncertainty regime
with Vit > θ . The importance of the Hansen estimator is that all parameters are
determined simultaneously with the determination of the threshold value of the
uncertainty measure. Hansen proposes a panel estimation method using a fixed-
effects transformation. Crucial in this method are the asymptotics of the confidence
levels of the thresholds. Hansen proposes procedures to determine the confidence
levels based on inverting the loglikelihood-ratio statistic (see for further details
Hansen 1999). Based on the predictions of the standard cash flow model, we expect
that if uncertainty is below the threshold, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is low
and hence the firm is probably investing less than proportionally. But if uncertainty
exceeds the threshold level, the investment-cash flow sensitivity increases. This
suggests that the estimated coefficients for β1 and β2 are expected to differ. In
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other words, cash flow may have different effects on firm investment depending on
the magnitude of the volatility effect.
The empirical model is estimated using conditional least squares. To that end the
observations are sorted on the threshold variable and the sums of squared residuals
are computed for all values of the threshold variable. The optimal value of the
threshold variable is the one that minimizes the sum of squared residuals. The op-
timal parameter estimates are the estimated α’s and β’s that belong to this optimal
threshold value. An important question is whether the threshold regression model
is statistically significant to its linear counterpart, which has the null hypothesis
H0: β1 = β2. In this case the threshold parameter is not defined under the null
hypothesis, which makes the testing problem complex. However, Hansen (1996)
shows that asymptotically valid p-values can be constructed by bootstrapping.4
Hansen also suggests that one should test for the number of thresholds. This implies
that the model with one and with no threshold should be compared, as well as the
specification with two and with a single threshold.
To apply the Hansen estimator a few empirical choices have to be made. First,
we need to decide on the choice of the control variables z. Here we closely follow
Houston and James (2001) in specifying an investment model by taking:
1. MB: the market-to-book value of equity. This variable is a proxy for Tobin’s
q. This variable is included to control for the fact that internal funds may proxy
for the profitability of investment, a major critique of the standard cash flow
model. Note that the variable we use to proxy for Tobin’s q is theoretically less
appealing than Tobin’s q itself, but it has the advantage that it can be measured
quite precisely. There is no information on the market value of debt whatsoever,
which complicates any specification of q;
2. SAL(−1)/K(−1): lagged sales over capital. This variable is included to pick
up the impact of past demand for final output on the investment decision. It
also proxies for future profitability;
3. (WC)/K(−1): cash flow might have another simple destination: the change
of working capital. This variable competes with capital expenditure;
4. LIQ/K(−1): the stock of liquid assets gives an indication of the availability of
short-term funds.
4 Valid confidence intervals for the threshold parameter can be based on the likelihood ratio (or
F ) statistic LR(θ) = (S(θ) − S(θˆ))/σˆ 2, which tests the null hypothesis H0: θ = θˆ . Here S(θ) is
the sum of squared errors of the estimated threshold regression when the threshold parameter equals
θ , S(θˆ ) is the sum of squared residuals belonging to the optimal threshold parameter θˆ , and σˆ 2 is
the residual variance belonging to the optimal threshold parameter θˆ . The likelihood ratio statistic
is equal to zero at θ = θˆ . Confidence intervals for the threshold parameter can be constructed by
inverting the distribution function of the likelihood ratio statistic. A graphical method to find the
confidence interval of the threshold parameter is to plot the likelihood ratio statistic LR(θ) against all
values of θ and to check for which values of θ crosses the horizontal line that shows the confidence
level of the test. Confidence intervals of the other parameters in the threshold regression, the α’s and
β’s, can be approximated by the conventional normal approximation as if the threshold estimate θˆ
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The second empirical choice relates to the choice of the uncertainty measures
as regime variable. We use three: stock price volatility (EQVOL), sales volatil-
ity (SALVOL) and employment volatility (EMPVOL). The first two measures are
widely used in empirical studies on the investment-uncertainty relation. Employ-
ment volatility represents the uncertainty the firm faces with respect to attracting
or firing of workers.
We are not interested in the fit of the linear model (the model that assumes equal
parameter estimates across the two classes), so we don’t report the results of the
linear model in detail. It is important to note that the Hansen estimation method is
a fixed effects method. We include time dummies (but don’t report the estimation
results). Table IV presents the results. The table shows that the Market-to-Book
variable is a poor determinant of investment. This fact is widely described in the
literature on investment (see e.g., Chirinko 1993). Lagged sales as a fraction of
material fixed assets seems to provide a better proxy of future profitability. Liquid
assets don’t provide a clear contribution, but changes in working capital are a clear
substitute for investment. The estimated values of the thresholds of all uncertainty
measures are above the mean and median values (see Table II). This implies that
the extreme sensitivity of investment to cash flow is found for the greater volatility
firms. The table also gives an indication of the likelihood of a second threshold. For
all models the improvement of the fit with a double threshold is not convincing,
except for the stock price volatility model. Most importantly, the table shows that
the cash-flow parameter for high volatility observations is about three times larger
than the corresponding parameter for low volatility. This can be observed for all
three models by looking at the lines labeled by CF(1) and CF(2). Table IV therefore
illustrates that there is a differential impact of cash flow on investment depending
on the degree of uncertainty that the firm is facing, suggesting that capital market
constraints are more severe for the relatively risky firms.
6. GMM Estimation
The threshold estimation technique applied in the previous section is based on an
OLS within-groups estimator. There is a serious drawback to this method since it
assumes that the regressors are uncorrelated with the error term. When one of the
regressors is correlated with the error term, the within-groups estimator provides
biased and inconsistent estimates. That this will certainly be the case in a dynamic






























it−1 is correlated with the error term, leading
to a seriously biased OLS estimator if the model is estimated in levels. It is simple
to show that the within transformation estimator, i.e., the fixed effects model, does
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Table IV. Threshold estimation results.
Dependent variable EQVOL SALVOL EMPVOL
I/K(−1)
MB 0.144 (0.148) −0.066 (0.122) −0.062 (0.118)
d(WC)/K(−1) −0.238 (0.063) −0.230 (0.063) −0.225 (0.064)
SAL(−1)/K(−1) 0.008 (0.004) 0.009 (0.005) 0.009 (0.004)
LIQ/K(−1) 0.071 (0.044) 0.092 (0.051) 0.078 (0.050)
Threshold 114.29 (105.20;124.53) 39.16 (38.03,40.22) 51.82 (25.60;61.74)
CF(1) 0.108 (0.042) 0.106 (0.041) 0.102 (0.044)
CF(2) 0.308 (0.050) 0.313 (0.057) 0.344 (0.054)
LR(1) 38.95 24.92 20.71
SSR(0) 251700.23 251700.23 251700.23
SSR(1) 239551.24 240268.49 241091.65
SSR(2) 231873.29 240268.49 239961.37
Second threshold 34.78 (31.09;36.39) 21.58 (13.63;27.77) 12.34 (9.67;46.59)
LR(2) 25.43 11.25 12.74
Standard errors between parentheses. CF(1) gives the parameter estimate of the low-volatility
regime, CF(2) gives the parameter estimate of the high-volatility regime, LR(1) denotes
the likelihood-ratio test for the single threshold effect, LR(2) denotes the likelihood ratio
of the double threshold effect, SSR(i) denotes the sum of squared residuals of the model



























+(eit − e¯it ) (10)
in which a bar above a variable x denotes the average of the variable. Since e¯it
























with (eit − e¯it ).
For this reason, we have not included a lagged dependent variable in the estim-
ation of the threshold model. Since the investment decision is basically a dynamic
problem, the I/K-ratio might be autocorrelated, which explains why so many
empirical investment studies do account for a lagged dependent variable. However,
this would need another estimation technique. Also in an investment model without
a lagged dependent variable the regressors may be correlated with the error term.
This will be the case if a subset of the regressors is endogenous, which is not un-
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with the investment rate (I/K). Then, the variable WC would be correlated with
the error term, leading to a biased OLS estimator.
A standard method to deal with estimation problems with variables that are cor-
related with the error term is to use instrumental variables. Before we explain the
method, it should be noted that in estimating the models we use information about
the threshold values for the uncertainty measures as determined in the previous
section. Ideally, the threshold should also be determined using the GMM routine.
However, as yet there is no estimator available.
The instrumental estimation technique we use is the system-generalized meth-
ods of moments (GMM) estimator devised by Arellano and Bond (1998). In fact,
we use a new version of DPD98. A method of moments estimator derives the coef-
ficients from the so-called moment restrictions, i.e., restrictions on the covariances
between regressors and the error term. The system GMM estimator of Arellano
and Bond estimates a system combining two sets of equations. The system GMM
estimator estimates a system combining two sets of equations consisting of a first
























+ ni + ei,t .5 (11)
If it is assumed that the errors are independent across firms and serially uncorrel-
ated, the following moment conditions can be used to obtain valid instruments for
















lagged two periods or more are valid instruments in the first





i,t−2 and earlier values are
generally not correlated with ei,t .
If the other regressor (zij t ) is exogenous, then all the past, present and future
values of zij are valid instruments. However, as argued above, there are several
reasons to believe that the other regressors in the empirical investment model are
endogenous, i.e., E(zi,t ei,s ) = 0 for s ≤ t . If this is the case, Arellano and Bond
(1998) propose the following moment conditions for the differenced equations
E[zi,t−s(ei,t − ei,t−1)] = 0 for s ≥ 2; t = 3, . . . T . This implies that values
of zi,t lagged two periods or more are valid instruments if zi,t is endogenous.
The whole history of the series in levels can be used as valid instruments for the
first-differences. Note, however, that in models with endogenous regressors, using
too many instruments in the later cross-sections could result in seriously biased
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If the investment model contains a lagged dependent variable, and if the
other regressor is endogenous, the following moment conditions are proposed by













E[zi,t−1(ηi + ei,t )] = 0;
Valid instruments for the regressions in levels are the lagged differences of the
corresponding variables. In this paper only the first-lag differences are used. Ad-
ditional lagged differences would be redundant, because these are covered by the
instruments of the first differences. Note that zit could be used as an instrument
in the levels equations if zi,t is strictly exogenous or predetermined.
The system GMM estimator is a two-step GMM estimator. In the first step,
homoskedasticity and independent error terms are assumed. In the second step,
these assumptions are relaxed by using a consistent variance-covariance matrix
that is constructed from the first step residuals. A problem with the two-step es-
timator is that it has weak small sample properties, which would bias the standard
errors downward. The estimator becomes inappropriate if a small number of cross-
section units is combined with a large number of instruments, i.e., the number of
time series units. In our case this could be problematic, since we only have 96
cross-section units (firms) and 8 observations per firm (1990–1997) in our data
set, which might result in biased asymptotic inference. We address this problem
in two ways. First, we present coefficients and t-values using the two-step GMM
estimates, based on robust, finite sample corrected standard errors. Windmeijer
(2000) shows how the two-step standard estimates can be corrected, and that is the
approach we have followed.6 Second, we do not use the whole history of lagged
variables as instruments for the first differenced equations. After experimenting
with different sets of instruments, we finally decided to only take the 2-period
lagged levels of the variables as instruments for the first differenced equations.
Note that in the estimates we also control for time effects by adding time dummies.
These time dummies are used as additional instruments.
The reliability of the system GMM estimation procedure depends heavily on
the validity of the instruments. We consider the validity of the instruments by
presenting a Sargan test. The Sargan test is a test on overidentifying restrictions.
It is asymptotically χ2-distributed and tests the null hypothesis of the validity of
the (overidentifying) instruments. p-values report the probability of incorrectly re-
jecting the null hypothesis: a p-value above 0.05 implies that the probability of
6 We thank Windmeijer for providing us with the new version of DPD, including the two-step
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incorrectly rejecting the null is greater than 0.05. In our case, a higher p-value
makes it more likely that the instruments are valid. We also test the reliability of
the instruments of the level equation by presenting the Difference Sargan test. The
Difference Sargan test is calculated by subtracting the value of the Sargan test of
a first differenced GMM estimate form the value of the Sargan test of the system
GMM estimate. The degrees of freedom of the Differenced Sargan test equal the
degrees of freedom of the system GMM Sargan test minus the first differenced
Sargan test. The Differenced Sargan test is also asymptotically χ2-distributed and
tests the null hypothesis of validity of the (overidentifying) instruments in the level
equation. The levels equations instruments are not rejected if the calculated value of
the Differenced Sargan test is lower than the theoretical value of a χ2 variable with
n degrees of freedom. The consistency of the estimates also depends on the absence
of serial correlation in the error terms. This will be the case if the differenced
residuals display significant negative first order serial correlation and no second-
order serial correlation. We present tests for first-order and second-order serial
correlation related to the estimated residuals in first differences. The test statistics
are asymptotically distributed as standard normal variables. The null hypothesis
here relates to “insignificance” so that a low p-value for the test on first-order
serial correlation and a high p-value for the test on second-order serial correlation
suggests that the disturbances are not serially correlated. The serial correlation tests
(M1 and M2 in the table) refer to the one-step GMM estimates.
The equations we estimate have the same structure as presented in the previous
section. The lag structure is also the same as assumed in the previous section, as
can be seen in Table V. The main difference is that here we do not endogenously
determine the threshold, but instead use the threshold value to determine an indic-
ator function with value 1 for the low volatility regime and 0 for the high volatility
regime.7 This indicator function is used to determine two cash flow variables, one
for the high volatility regime and one for the low volatility regime. Another dif-
ference is that we now also add, in some of the regressions, the lagged dependent
variable. The estimates are presented in Table V.
Although coefficient values differ for the threshold estimates and the GMM
estimates, the main message remains: the cash flow coefficient is much higher
for the high volatility regime than for the low volatility regime. This holds for all
volatility measures used in the estimates. Note that the estimates without a lagged
independent variable suffer from second-order serial correlation in the differenced
residuals. Therefore, we have also presented estimates in which the lagged de-
pendent variable is added as an additional regressor. For these estimates, there is
no evidence for serial correlation. Moreover, the Sargan and the Difference Sargan
test suggest that the instruments are valid. Most importantly, also the cash flow
7 With respect to EMPVOL, we use the value of the lower confidence interval, instead of the
average value of the threshold, to compute the indicator function. When the average value was used,
the GMM estimates did not give any results due to problems with inverting the matrix, which is
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Table V. System GMM estimates.
Dependent variable EQVOL EQVOL SALVOL SALVOL EMPVOL EMPVOL
I/K(−1)
MB 0.203 0.198 0.011 0.018 −0.147 −0.175
(0.169) (0.179) (0.108) (0.123) (0.188) (0.179)
[0.229] [0.269] [0.914] [0.885] [0.435] [0.327]
d(WC)/K(−1) −0.132 −0.140 −0.141 −0.127 −0.208 −0.185
(0.065) (0.059) (0.046) (0.042) (0.087) (0.075)
[0.043] [0.018] [0.002] [0.002] [0.017] [0.013]
SAL(−1)/K(−1) −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0006 0.0005 0.0007
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
[0.956] [0.961] [0.874] [0.782] [0.848 [0.789]
LIQ/K(−1) −0.019 −0.016 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.006
(0.030) (0.031) (0.027) (0.025) (0.044) (0.039)
[0.521] [0.594] [0.791] [0.780] [0.974] [0.876]
CF(1) 0.208 0.199 0.163 0.167 0.120 0.115
(0.074) (0.071) (0.053) (0.052) (0.106) (0.096)
[0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.001] [0.260] [0.230]
CF(2) 0.327 0.327 0.443 0.434 0.341 0.315
(0.078) (0.082) (0.054) (0.049) (0.049) (0.096)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
I (−1)/K(−2) 0.082 0.059 0.120
(0.066) (0.061) (0.071)
[0.211] [0.328] [0.093]
Sargan 72.006 86.682 70.789 83.214 76.734 85.204
[0.286] [0.211] [0.321] [0.294] [0.172] [0.244]
Difference Sargan 28.93 34.47 29.98 36.19 34.51 53.45
df = 36 df = 42 df = 36 df = 42 df = 36 df = 42
CV DS 50.71 57.84 50.71 57.84 50.71 57.84
M1 −2.380 −2.864 −2.620 −2.964 −2.612 −3.101
[0.017] [0.004] [0.009] [0.003] [0.009] [0.002]
M2 −2.583 −0.750 −2.043 −0.647 −2.504 −0.738
[0.010] [0.453] [0.041] [0.518] [0.012] [0.460]
Standard errors between parentheses; p-values between brackets. Sargan tests for the validity of
the instruments in the differenced and levels equations; Difference Sargan tests for the validity of
the instruments in the levels equation. df denotes degrees of freedom. CV DS denotes the critical
value for the Difference Sargan (instruments are reliable if Difference Sargan is below CV DS).
M1 tests for the absence of first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals; M2 tests
for the absence of second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. Time dummies
are taken into account. They are not presented for reasons of space. CF(1) gives the parameter
estimate of the low-volatility regime, CF(2) gives the parameter estimate of the high-volatility
regime. In the first differenced equations, for all variables the lagged two period levels are used
as instruments. For the levels equations, the one period lagged values of the first difference of all
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coefficient is also much higher for the estimates with the lagged dependent variable
in the high volatility regimes.
7. Conclusions
This paper argues that firms that are confronted with a large degree of uncertainty
will probably suffer from more severe capital market constraints. We test our hy-
pothesis by following the methodology to estimate investment equations including
a measure for internal funds (cash flows). In line with the literature we interpret
a higher cash flow coefficient as an indication of more severe capital market con-
straints. We use two estimation procedures: a threshold panel least squares model
estimates the threshold values for the uncertainty variables, and a Generalized
Method of Moments estimator that allows for endogeneity of the regressors. The
results of both estimation techniques provide support for our hypothesis for a panel
of 96 Dutch listed firms.
This paper also contributes to the discussion on the usefulness of cash flow as a
measure of financial constraints. We do this by analyzing a slightly adjusted version
of the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) model. Following Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
(FHP) (1988) it is common to assume that a higher elasticity suggests more severe
capital market constraints. However, several authors criticize this view by showing
that it might be so that firms that do not face financial constraints will demonstrate
higher investment-cash flow sensitivities. For example, Cleary (1999) argues that
unconstrained firms might use their cash flow instantaneously for seemingly profit-
able investment projects knowing that they are able to attract external funds at any
time. In addition, Almeida and Campello (2001) show that, as long as the firm is
not fully unconstrained, investment-cash flow sensitivity will decrease if financial
constraints become more severe. If current investment is seen as collateral for fu-
ture borrowing and shocks to internal wealth affect current investment, firms that
are less constrained will borrow more. So less constrained firms are more sensitive
to cash flow through the amplification effect of collateral.
We do not attempt to fully solve this dispute. Nor do we try to come to a
general conclusion as to whether the cash flow sensitivity is a useful measure
for financial constraints. As such, our analysis does not shed a new light on the
specific circumstances the above-mentioned authors are referring to. Our aim is
much more limited. We examine whether an increase in the cash flow sensitivity
can be associated with more capital constraints if firms are classified by means of
the different degrees of uncertainty they face. We show that cash flow is a relevant
measure if the uncertainty originates from cost uncertainty. Therefore, our con-
tribution seems supportive of the main FHP conclusion that financial constraints
are likely to imply large investment-cash flow sensitivities for firms. However,
our analysis also provides some support for the critics of FHP by showing that
additional assumptions with respect to the cost and production function are needed
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